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The standard-gamble (SG) method has been accepted as the “gold standard” for the elic-
itation of utility when risk or uncertainty is involved in decisions, and thus for the measurement
of utility in medical decisions. It is based on the assumptions of expected-utility theory.
Unfortunately, there is now abundant evidence that expected utility is not empirically valid,
and that the SG method overestimates risk aversion and the utilities of impaired health
states. This paper shows how rank-dependent utility theory, a newly developed theory in
decision science, can explain the main violations of expected utility. Thus it provides a means
for correcting the SG method and for improving the assessments of quality-adjusted life
years for medical decisions in which there is uncertainty about outcomes. Key words health-
state utility; risk aversion; rank dependence: medical decision making; standard gamble.
(Med Decis  Making 1995;15:180-186)
Risk is a central aspect in medical decision making,
as one usually faces uncertainty about the outcomes
of a medical decision. Hence this paper examines the
measurement of utility as an index for health out-
comes that can be used to evaluate decisions involving
risk or uncertainty. The three most common methods
for utility elicitation in medical decision making are
the time-tradeoff (TTO) method, the visual-analog scale,
and the standard gamble. The first two do not explic-
itly involve risk; hence they lack validity for applica-
tions in which uncertainty about outcomes is relevant.
Risk and uncertainty are the topics of this paper, there-
fore we concentrate on the third method, the standard
gamble (SG).
If a person behaves perfectly well in agreement with
expected utility theory, then the SG method yields
perfect utility values. Hence the method has been ac-
cepted as the “gold standard” for utility elicitation in
the medical field. However, critical tests of expected
utility in the decision-theory literature have shown
that expected utility is not empirically valid,1-10 and,
as is discussed further below, anomalies for the SG
method have commonly been demonstrated. No sys-
tematic test of the empirical validity of expected utility
has yet been reported in the medical-decision-making
literature; some indirect evidence is discussed.“,‘”
It has been observed before in the medical field that
people exhibit a systematic dislike for risk that seems
to be based on more than the characteristics of out-
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comes. The term “gambling effect” has sometimes been
used to describe that systematic dislike for risk.“-‘”
The classic description through risk aversion in ex-
pected utility does not suffice to explain all aspects of
the gambling effect, and as a result, cannot explain
the commonly found anomalies of the SG method.
Explanations have been proposed for the gambling
effect,14,16 but they have not been extended to coherent
theories that describe general decision making and
incorporate more complex and realistic choice situ-
ations than those occurring in the utility-elicitation
experiments. This paper presents a new explanation
of the gambling effect that does result from a generally
applicable and coherent theory.
The basic assumption of the theory discussed in
this paper is that subjects pay attention to outcomes
in a way that is not proportional to the associated
probabilities; that is, probabilities are transformed into
decision weights. Thus an explanation can be pro-
vided for the dimension of risk aversion that cannot
be described in terms of valuations of outcomes.
While the idea of probability transformation is old,
it has only recently become possible to build coherent
theories on this idea, by the rank-dependent-utility
approach. This approach has become popular in de-
cision theory in recent years.5,7-9,17-24 We show how
transformed probabilities can explain the commonly
found anomalies of the SG method. On the basis of
rank-dependent utility, an alternative way is proposed
for deriving utility values from SG questions. As an
illustration, this alternative way is used to correct the
utilities elicited from two testicular cancer patients”
for distortions of probability. Finally, a general expla-
nation of rank-dependent utility theory is given in the
appendix.
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Expected utility (EU) is the standard normative model
for decision under risk and uncertainty. In EU one
determines quantitative values, “utilities,” for out-
comes, and probabilities for uncertainties. To evaluate
a medical treatment, one multiplies all outcome util-
ities by their probabilities of occurrence and takes the
sum of all these products as the EU value of the treat-
ment. The treatment with the maximum EU is chosen.
Axioms to justify the model have been proposed.25-27
An example of the SG method is illustrated in figure
1A. In medical decision making, the SG method con-
ventionally adopts the variable-probability-equivalent
method: the probability in the gamble is varied until
indifference is obtained between the gamble and the
certain outcome. Alternatively, one can use a variable-
certainty-equivalent method, where an indifference
between a certain outcome and a risky gamble is ob-
tained by varying the certain outcome. In medical de-
cision making this method has been used for the elic-
itation of utility for life years. Henceforth this paper
uses the term SG exclusively for the probability-equiv-
alent  method; the term certainty-equivalent method
is used for the other method.
People generally exhibit a dislike for gambles and
seem to value risky outcomes relatively lower than
certain outcomes. For instance, people usually prefer
ten years of life in good health to a 50-50 gamble
resulting in either 20 years of good health or imme-
diate death. That is, people disprefer a gamble for life
years over expected length of life. This phenomenon
which has been called “risk aversion,” leads, given a
utility value of 0 for the worst outcome and a utility
value of 1 for the best outcome, to a relatively higher
valuation of the intermediate outcomes,28 i.e., to a con-
cave utility.
The above explanation of risk aversion by means of
concavity of utility remains within the realm of EU
theory, and has been one of the classic EU results.
Thus, risk aversion seems to pose no problem for EU
theory, and is by itself no challenge to the SG method.
However, several problems have been found in relation
to the SG method that do question its validity. For
instance, if the EU model were descriptively accurate,
then the elicitation of utilities through the SG method
and the certainty-equivalent method should yield the
same utility values, and the utility curves derived from
the certainty-equivalent method should be indepen-
dent of the particular probability used. However, this
is not the empirical finding; the SG method usually
gives higher utility values than the certainty-equivalent
method, and utility curves derived from the certainty-
equivalent method are higher as the probability used
is closer to 1. This finding has been extensively doc-
umented . 21 ,29 -36
No systematic test of the empirical validity of ex-
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FIGURE 1. (standard gamble). A(left), Find p to give  indiffence.  Under
EU. UllOyl  = p. B(right), Find q to give indifference. Under ELI,
uloyl = 2q.
pected utility has yet been reported in the medical
decision-making literature. An indirect test was ob-
tained by Llewellyn-Thomas et al.” There, patients’
utilities for health states were elicited by means of SGs,
first with perfect health as best outcome and death as
worst outcome, but next also with other best and worst
outcomes. Under EU, the latter SGs should give con-
sistent results, but this was not found. Llewellyn-
Thomas et al. did suggest that alternative theories than
EU might explain their finding, but their study was
not designed to investigate that possibility. An indirect
test of EU can also be derived from the utility mea-
surements for life duration described by Stiggelbout
et al.12 Here, in addition to the SG method, an adjusted
TT0 measurement was used. In the latter measure-
ment, the “certainty-equivalent method” was used to
adjust TTO results and make them agree with ex-
pected-utility theory; this method had been intro-
duced by Pliskin et al.“’ Under expected utility the SG
and the adjusted TT0 method should indeed, up to
random error, provide identical utility values. The dif-
ferences that were found were, however, systematic:
the SG method yielded higher utility values and thus
suggested higher risk aversion; this agrees with the
common finding in the decision literature cited above.
In the present paper we argue that both methods
give utility values that are too high, thereby suggesting
a degree of risk aversion that is too strong. In general,
the dislike for gambles has dimensions that cannot be
described by EU with concave utility. Therefore, we
search for explanations that relax the restrictions of
EU. First we present an example to demonstrate that
the classic EU theory does not suffice to explain all
aspects of choice under risk.
Let us compare the value p, to give indifference in
figure IA, with the value q to give indifference in figure
1B. Notice that, under EU, not only p but also 2q
should be identical to the utility of ten years in perfect
health (setting the utility of 20 years in perfect health
equal to 1 and the utility of immediate death equal to
0). The EU of the upper branch in figure 1B is 4. U (2Oyr)
= 4. The utility of the lower branch is 0.5 * U(lOyr1.
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Equality results if 2q = U (1Oyr).  The empirical finding
is, however21,29,30,34
The value p in figure 1A is usually higher than the value
29 in figure 1B.
This finding obviously falsifies EU; it provides an
example of aversion to risk that lies outside the realm
of ELJ. Because of aversion to risk, the “riskless gamble”
(10 years, perfect health)* is overvalued in comparison
with the three remaining risky gambles, and p must
be additionally high to make up for this. The utility
measurement of figure 1B has been used in the lottery-
equivalent method for eliciting utilities, introduced by
McCord and de Neufville.33 McCord and de Neufville
did not provide an elaborate theory to justify their
method.
In the literature on utility measurement for risky
medical decisions, no elaborated models that describe
deviations from EU have hitherto been introduced. We
briefly discuss two explanations that have been pro-
posed for phenomena such as that in the above ex-
ample. For the first explanation,‘” suppose an individ-
 ual compares a 50-50 gamble giving either ten healthy
years or immediate death with a riskless  gamble giving
three certain healthy years. The riskless  gamble re-
ceives utility U (3yr), where U denotes the utility. Under
EU theory, the risky gamble is valued by 0.5. U(lOyr)
+ 0.5 * u(Oyr).  One way to explain the gambling effect
is by subtracting a term Us, to incorporate the disutility
of gambling; that is, the gamble is valued by 0.5. U (1Oyr)
+ 0.5 * U (Oyrl  - Us. For a general theory along these
lines, however, it must be specified how the term Us
is determined and in which manner it depends on
the gamble g with which it is associated. We are not
aware of a general coherent theory that can be de-
veloped along these lines.
Let us now turn to a second explanation. Gafni and
Torrance’” propose the following utility function for
life duration x:
11 - exp(-h.xll/k
The parameter k determines the scale unit of mea-
surement and is chosen so that the utility of the max-
imal length of life is 1. The utility of 0 years is 0, in-
dependent of the choices of k and A. The constant of
interest is A; it is assumed to consist of three terms,
i.e., A = b + r + g. Here b is a parameter for the
“quantity effect,” r for the “time effect,” and g for the
“gambling effect.” The larger A is, the more concave
(often interpreted as risk-averse) the utility is. It will
be obvious that this utility function, if used in an ex-
pected-utility criterion, cannot explain the phenom-
*A gamble for which it is certain what the resulting outcome will
be is called a riskless  gamble.
ena of interest to this paper, i.e., violations of expected
utility. In particular, the gambling parameter then can-
not account for a dislike of risk that extends beyond
the valuation of outcomes. Gafni and Torrance do not
present a theory in which their utility function could
be used that would deviate from expected utility.
Therefore, a theory is needed that explains devia-
tions from expected utility, and solves problems en-
countered in the SG measurements. Such a theory is
presented in the next section.
Non-expected Utllily to Explain the Gambling Effect and to
lmprove Utility Elicitations
In the decision-theory literature, many models have
recently been developed to explain empirical devia-
tions from EU. The models studied most are the rank-
dependent models, which formalize transformed
probabilities.17 That idea has a much older history,  but
the previous theories were hindered by theoretical
problems. Further comments are provided in the ap-
pendix. For simplicity we describe only the theory for
simple choices in the main body of the paper, where
the ideas of the theory are easy to understand. A reader
interested in the general theory is referred to the ap-
pendix, where rank-dependent utility is described in
detail. The appendix also demonstrates that rank-de-
pendent utility is a coherent theory that can describe
general decision making.
The basic idea of the theory is that people do not
treat probabilities in a linear manner, as EU theory
supposes, but that people transform probabilities into
decision weights. This can of course happen because
of psychological misconceptions of numerical prob-
abilities, but it can also be a conscious and deliberate
choice of the decision maker. For instance, it could
be a deliberate decision to pay relatively more atten-
tion to worst outcomes of a decision than to better
outcomes. The decision weight for the worst outcome
is then larger than its probability. The general dislike
of gambling that extends beyond the valuation of out-
comes can thus be modeled through transformed
probabilities: if one lets the decision weights for bad
outcomes be relatively higher than those for good out-
comes, then this will systematically decrease the value
of risky gambles. An intuitive motivation for rank-de-
pendent utility is that the change in decision attitude,
caused by the presence of uncertainty and probabil-
ities, may be more naturally modeled through a free-
dom in the processing of probabilities than in the
processing of utilities.
We use below a notation such as (p, xw) to denote a
gamble that with probability p results in x years of life
and with probability 1 - p in immediate death. For
instance (0.5,20yr)  denotes the gamble that with prob-
ability 0.5 results in 20 years of life and with probability
0.5 in immediate death. We start by denoting the prob-
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FIGURE 2. Probability transformation. The most commonly found
probability transformation.
ability transformation of a person by the symbol w; so
for each probability p, w(p) is the transformed value.
Natural assumptions are w(O)  = 0 (no weight for im-
possibility), w(l) = 1 (all weight to certainty), and w(p)
> w (q 1 for p > q (higher weight for higher probability).
Now the value of a gamble (p, x:) is w(p). C/(.x:) instead
of p. U (~1 as it was in EU theory.
We explained the model above for outcomes de-
scribing life durations. Rank-dependent utility can
similarly be applied to other outcomes. For instance,
consider a SG experiment where a patient is indifferent
between living 20 years in an impaired health state Q
or a gamble that with probability p gives 20 years of
life in perfect health, and with probability 1 - p gives
immediate death. Suppose we set the utility U(2Oyr,
perfect health) equal to 1, and the utility of immediate
death equal to 0. Under rank-dependent utility, the
value of the gamble is not p. U (2Oyr, perfect health) =
p, as it would be under expected utility, but it is
w(pl*11(20yr,  perfect health) = w(p). The value of the
“riskless gamble” of living 20 years in impaired health
is w(l) .u(ZOyr, impaired health) = 1.U12Oyr,  impaired
health) = ul2Oyr, impaired health), which does not
deviate from expected utility. The indifference ex-
pressed by the patient implies that the utility u(2Oyr,
impaired health) is given by
~(20 yr, impaired health) = w(p)
which is different from the value p that would be as-
signed under expected utility.
The form of a probability transformation that is usu-
ally found is presented in figure 2; the graph is S-
shaped. This shape has been confirmed in many stud-
i e s . 7 , 9 , 1 8 , 2 1 , 3 4 , 3 8 - 4 2  Small probabilities are overesti-
mated, high probabilities are underestimated, and the
graph intersects the diagonal around 0.35; the value
at 0.5 is approximately 0.42. The largest deviation from
the diagonal is around 0.85, and the graph is fairly
linear, in accordance with EU, in the middle region.
It deviates considerably from EU for small and large
probabilities only. This agrees with the common find-
ing that a small probability that changes impossible
into possible (p = 0.1 instead of p = 01,  or possible
into certainty ( p = 1 instead of p = 0.91 receives more
attention than a probability that merely changes pos-
sibility into a higher possibility (p = 0.6 instead of p
= 0.5).
Of course, probability transformation will vary from
one individual to another, and its elicitation is no easy
task.20,39 It is, however, clear from the decision-theory
literature that for the average individual the probabil-
ity-transformation function is as depicted in figure 2,
rather than the identity function as assumed in ex-
pected utility. Hence, in general, without further infor-
mation about an individual’s personal probability-trans-
formation function, it will be a definite improvement
for the utility elicitation of outcomes if the transfor-
mation as depicted in figure 2 is used instead of linear
probabilities, as has been the case hitherto in SG ex-
periments. Let us assume now that the transformation
in figure 2, denoted w, is the true transformation for
a specific patient. We consider below the implications
for utility elicitation, first for the SG, then for the cer-
tainty-equivalent method, and, finally, for the lottery-
equivalent method.
Assume that in a SG a patient chooses a probability
p such that (20yr, impaired health) is indifferent to a
gamble that with probability p yields (20yr, perfect
health) and with probability 1 - p immediate death.
Then, given the convention U(2Oyr,  perfect health) =
1 and U(immediate death) = 0, the utility U(2Oyr,  im-
paired health) should be assessed as w(p), rather than
as p. For most impaired health states, p will usually
be higher than 0.5, so w(p) is lower than p. Then also
the true utility w(p) is lower than p, the utility value
that is assigned in traditional applications of the SG
method. This explains our claim that the traditional
SG gives utility values that are too high.
Next we turn to the implications for the certainty-
equivalent elicitation method. Here one usually takes
a 50-50 gamble, say (0.5, 2Oyr),  and finds a certain
outcome that is indifferent to it. Say the outcome (7yr)
is indifferent to it. It is custom to derive from this that
U(7yr1  = 0.5. In absence of further information, how-
ever, we suggest using U(7yr) = 0.42, given that the
average value for ~(0.51 found in the decision literature
is 0.42. Notice that this does not deviate much from
the customary result of the certainty-equivalent method,
because ~(0.5) is not very different from 0.5. The prob-
abilities occurring in SG questions are usually higher,
and their w-values thus deviate more. This gives a the-
oretical explanation for the higher utility values that
are usually found by SG elicitations than by certainty-
equivalent elicitations.
Next, let us consider the indifference (0.5, 1Oyr) -
(q, 20yr)  as used in the lottery-equivalent  method. The
rank-dependent model gives ~(0.5) . u(lOyr) = w(q) * I,
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FIGURE 3. Old and new elicited utilities. The thin curves represent
utilities as traditionally elicited. The bold curves describe the util-
ities after correction for probability distortion.
so U ( l 0 y r )  = w(q)/w(0.5). Here q will be a value around
0.3, so that w(q) may even be larger than q. As w(0.5)
is usually somewhat smaller than 0.5, it may be ex-
pected that in this range of values the lottery-equiv-
alent method, which sets U(l0yr) = 2 q, may even give
utility values that are too low.
Mostly, as can be seen from figure 2, the transformed
probabilities are lower than the original probabilities,
and gambles are therefore valued systematically lower
than EU suggests. For small probabilities, the trans-
formed values are higher and a higher preference for
lotteries than EU would suggest can be expected. Thus,
for short life durations that involve small probabilities
in SG questions, one might expect that traditional util-
ity measurement analyses suggest a risk-seeking util-
ity. Verhoef et al.“‘:’ did indeed find risk seeking for
short durations of life, although the method of analysis
employed there was different from ours.
Figure 3 illustrates two characteristic utility curves
for life duration, elicited from testicular cancer patients’”
using the certainty-equivalent method. The thin curves
MEDICAL DECISION MAKING
in the graphs illustrate the utilities as assessed, with
no transformation of probabilities assumed. One of the
more risk-averse and one of the less risk-averse pa-
tients were chosen for this illustration. The bold curves
illustrate the utilities that result when we assume rank-
dependent utility with w(0.5) = 0.42. These lead to a
lower degree of risk aversion in the utilities, because
the risk aversion is now partly incorporated in terms
of the processing of probabilities. Given the evidence
described above, the bold utility curves are more re-
alistic and hence more appropriate for use in nor-
mative decisions than the thin ones.
Our method is obviously ad hoc because no indi-
vidual probability transformations were elicited from
the patients. Still, in the absence of such information,
the general average value w(0.5) = 0.42 is preferable
to 0.5 as commonly used in utility elicitations, because
the latter value is systematically biased upwards! Fur-
ther arguments for the use of general average values
in individual elicitations are given by Camerer and Ho,”
who state, regarding elicitations of probability trans-
formations: “and the parameter estimates were re-
markably stable across studies.” For these reasons, we
recommend the use of curves such as the bold ones
in figure 3, based on rank-dependent utility, in utility
elicitation, rather than the (thin) conventional curves.
Let us finally summarize the implications of rank-
dependent utility for utility elicitation, and the im-
mediate improvement that it makes possible:
l People do not behave according to expected util-
ity, but deviate systematically, and their choices are
better described by rank-dependent utility. This means
that one should incorporate probability transforma-
tions, modeled by a function w(p).
l The function w(p) varies from individual to indi-
vidual, and its elicitation is no easy task. Abundant
evidence has been gathered in the decision literature,
however, that the average w function is as depicted in
figure 2, rather than the identity function used in ex-
pected-utility theory. Therefore, in the absence of fur-
ther information about the w function of an arbitrary
individual, inference based on the w function of figure
2 will, on the average, give better utility assessments
than traditional assessments based on expected util-
ity.
l A topic for future research is the shape of the w
function in specific medical contexts.
C o n c l u s i o n  
Rank-dependent utility is a coherent theoretical
model that does satisfy natural conditions for decision
making; these conditions have been established in ax-
iomatizations.“” The theory explains anomalies that
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have been found in applications of the SG method, in
whidh health measures are to be obtained that can be
used in evaluations of risky medical decisions. A first
improvement for utility  elicitation that is immediately
suggested by this theory is as follows: An elicited cer-
tainty equivalent of a 50-50 gamble does not have a
utility value that is the midpoint of the utility values
of the two risky‘outcomes, but the utility value is 0.42
times the highest utility plus 0.58 times the lowest
utility. This leads to a lower risk aversion, thus to de-
cisions where long life durations and good health states
are valued relatively higher than in traditional analy-
ses. Further refinements can be obtained by investi-
gations of the probability transformations of individual
subjects, and their dependency on the subjects’ char-
acteristics and other variables and circumstances. Thus,
measurements of quality-adjusted life years and other
multiattribute utility measures in the health area can
be improved. 
We conclude that rank-dependent utility gives a
promising new explanation for risk behavior and can
lead to improved utility elicitations.
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AP P ENDIX
General Explanation of Rank-dependent Utility
In the main body of the text we have, for accessibility of
the exposition, restricted attention to the simplest possible
gambles. In this appendix we briefly describe rank-depen-
dent utility in general. It is presently the model most often
used in decision theory to explain deviations from expected-
utility (EU)  theory, and is based on the idea of expressing
risk attitudes not only by the valuation of outcomes by the
  utility, but also by a valuation of the probabilities through a
probability transformation.
The idea of expressing risk attitudes through transformed
probabilities is old; the earliest reference that we are aware
of is Preston and Baratta  However, the early ap-
proaches would transform probabilities for fixed outcomes
and use versions of the following formula to value gambles;
here we denote by (p,, ,x,; ; p,,, r(,,) the gamble giving out-
come ,Y, with probability p,, , and outcome ,Y,, with prob-
ability p,,:
II
(PI, x,; .;p,,, r,,) -+ c w(pJU(  iq)
j=1
This theory never became very popular. Remarkably, only
quite recently19,44J it was discovered that this formula leads
to a violation of “stochastic dominance.” That is, there exists
a gamble such that an increase of one of its payments leads
to a decrease of its value. This is a counterintuitive impli-
cation, and therefore the formula has been abandoned in
the recent decision-theory literature.
The idea of expressing risk attitude by transformed prob-
abilities was, however, kept alive, and was revived by Quig-
gin,” who invented rank-dependent utility. The basic idea
is to transform not the probabilities for fixed outcomes, but
so-called “cumulative probabilities.” As an example, suppose
that in the gamble Ip,, p,; ; P,~, x,,) the outcomes are rank-
ordered from most to least preferred, e.g., ,x, > > ,v,, if
outcomes describe life duration. Then p,, (p, + prlj , Ip,
+ + p,,l are the cumulative probabilities, i.e., probabilities
of receipt of a value ,K; or more. The rank-dependent utility
of the gamble now is
II
cp,,&;,  .;p,,,r,,)  + c ~;~(‘q
i-1
where v, = w(p,I, ?r, = wcp,  + p-1 - w(p,), T, =  wcp,  +
p2 + p,l - wcp, + p_), . . . . ?r,, = w(pl  + + p,l) - wtp,
+ + p,, ,I. So, the “decision weight” rr, associated with
outcome ,xi is a difference of two transformed cumulative
probabilities, f irst  the cumulative probability p, + + pi
of receiving  xj or more, second the cumulative probability
p, + + pi_,  of receiving strictly more than xi. Notice that
for the calculation of the decision weights the rank-order of
the outcomes is important; this explains the name of the
rank-dependent utility theory.
For  gambles  (p, r(; 1 - p, 0) with U(Oyr) = 0, the rank-
dependent utility reduces to the simple wlpW (,Y), and this
formula was used throughout the main body of the text. For
understanding the formula of rank-dependent utility it is
useful to veri% that, if w is the identity function, the formula
reduces to the classic EU. The theory has recently been used
to modify prospect theory.7,20 An extensive discussion is be-
yond the scope of this paper.17,23
